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Introduction
Most states and many localities have civil rights laws that are substan-
tially equivalent to the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"),' which means
they at least ban discrimination based on the seven factors outlawed by
the FHA (i.e., race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, and
disability).2 Many of these state and local laws also include other pro-
tected classes, such as age, marital status, sexual orientation, and source
of income.3
This Article reviews state and local efforts to outlaw source-of-income
discrimination.4 (For its part, Congress currently has multiple bills before it
Robert Schwemm is the Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor at the Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law. This Article is excerpted from Robert G. Schwemm,
Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2020).
1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968). The
FHA, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2019). For a list of the over sev-
enty localities and thirty-five states whose fair housing laws have been determined by
HUD to be substantially equivalent to the FHA for purposes of referring FHA-agency
complaints, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
app. C (2019).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617.
3. For a list of the states with such prohibitions, see SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 30:3.
The FHA authorizes state and local laws to go beyond the FHA's protections. See 42
U.S.C. § 3615; see also 24 C.F.R. § 115.204(h) (2019) (providing, in HUD's FHA regulations,
that a state or local law's coverage of additional protected classes beyond those included
in the FHA does not mean that law is not substantially equivalent to the FHA).
4. "Source-of-income" discrimination is to be distinguished from "income" discrimi-
nation. The latter deals with "how much," rather than "where from," and is generally
viewed as compatible with fair housing laws (e.g., landlords in FHA cases have always
been seen to have a legitimate interest in their tenants' ability to pay the rent). See
SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 10:2 n.5 (citing cases). However, the source of a tenant's income
is a different matter; in theory, where a tenant's income comes from should not matter to
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that would add such a prohibition to the FHA.) Part I of the Article provides
an overview of the growing number of states and localities that have banned
housing discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders6 and others based
a landlord, so long as that income is reasonably likely to continue and does not impose
other risks or hardships on the landlord.
Research on the value of prohibiting source-of-income discrimination in hous-
ing includes Tamica Daniel, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing Choice Voucher Program:
Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 99 GEO. L.J. 769
(2010); Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act's New Frontier,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (1996).
5. See Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2019, S. 1986 and H.R. 3516, 116th Cong.
(2019) (proposing to add source of income and military status as protected classes under
the FHA); American Housing and Economic Mobility Act of 2019, S. 787 and H.R. 1737,
116th Cong. § 301 (2019) (proposing to add source of income and three other protected
classes to the FHA); Landlord Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 232, 116th Cong. (2019)
(proposing to amend the FHA to outlaw rental discrimination because a "tenant is the
holder of a housing voucher").
A number of FHA-based cases have challenged source-of-income discrimination
because of its negative impact on racial minorities or other currently protected classes
under the FHA, with mixed results. For an extensive review of these cases, see Robert G.
Schwemm, Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair Housing Act, 70 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020).
6. Section 8 vouchers-now known as Housing Choice Vouchers-began in 1974 and
now make up the federal government's largest rental subsidy program, serving over
2.2 million low-income households. See MARY K. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
& URBAN DEV., A PILOT STUDY OF LANDLORD ACCEPTANCE OF HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS
iii (2018); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (codifying the program); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS FACT SHEET, https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing
_choice voucher-program-section_8 (providing overview of the program) (last visited
Oct. 17, 2019).
The basic features of the voucher program have remained the same over the years.
HUD funds the program and administers it through local public housing agencies
("PHAs"). 24 C.F.R. § 982.151(a)(1) (2018). HUD sets rental payment-standard limits for
each geographic area, and voucher holders rent units that fall within these limits. See
id. § 982.503(a)(1). Low-income families apply for a voucher from the local PHA, which
screens them for income and other eligibility requirements. See id. § 982.201(a). A family
with a voucher seeks housing on its own, generally paying no more than thirty percent
of their income for rent, with the remainder paid to the landlord by the government. See
id. §§ 982.1(a)(3), 982.503(b). Landlords are responsible for screening prospective tenants
and may use their regular selection criteria. See id. §§ 982.307(a)(2), 982.308(b)(2). Once
an assisted family finds an appropriate unit and a landlord willing to rent to them, it
seeks approval of the tenancy from the PHA, id. § 982.302(b), which first must inspect the
apartment and determine that the rent and lease terms conform to the program's require-
ments. Id. § 982.405. The PHA then enters into a contract with the property owner that
specifies payment amounts and other terms, id. § 981.1(b)(2), and the property owner also
enters into a written lease with the assisted family, id. § 982.308(b).
From a landlord's perspective, having to deal with a PHA and HUD-including the
need for inspections and uniform lease provisions-may be unappealing, and the eco-
nomic incentives to participate in the program may be low in tight rental markets. As a
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on their source of income. Part II then considers the legal challenges that
have been mounted against such laws. Finally, Part III describes some of the
cases and litigation issues that these laws have generated.
I. State and Local Source-of-Income Laws: Locations and Variety
By 2019, fifteen states and over seventy localities had enacted housing
laws that ban some form of source-of-income discrimination.7 The states are
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin.' The localities include New York City, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., St. Louis, Memphis, Milwaukee,
Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego.' A handful of these laws date
back to the 1970s, and another twenty were passed in the 1980s and 1990s,
but most-over fifty-have been enacted since 2000,1° with New York state
and Los Angeles (both city and county) being among the most recent."
These laws reflect a variety of approaches. Some states (e.g., Massachu-
setts) prohibit only discrimination against recipients of Section 8 vouchers
result, many housing providers have refused to accept voucher holders. See CUNNING-
HAM ET AL., supra, at 9 (concluding, based on review of numerous studies, that "research
consistently finds evidence of both perceived and actual landlord discrimination against
voucher holders"); infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
7. For a list of these laws, see POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, STATE
AND LOCAL SOURCE-OF-INCOME NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS: PROTECTIONS THAT EXPAND
HOUSING CHOICE AND ACCESS TO HEALTHY, STABLE HOMES app. B (updated June 25,
2019), available at https://prrac.org/state-and-local-source-of-income-nondiscrimination
-laws-protections [hereinafter PRRAC-PROTECTIONS].
8. See id. For more on these state laws, see infra notes 14, 19-20, 35-36, 52 and accom-
panying text (California); notes 15, 19, 28-29, 32 and accompanying text (Connecticut);
note 14 (Delaware); notes 12, 21, 27 and accompanying text (Maine); notes 12, 18, 20,
22-27, 32 and accompanying text (Massachusetts); note 13 and accompanying text (Min-
nesota); notes 18, 20, 32 and accompanying text (New Jersey); notes 11, 18 (New York);
note 13 (North Dakota); notes 14, 16, 19 (Oregon); note 19 (Utah); notes 13, 19 (Vermont);
note 18 (Washington); and notes 14, 19, 33 and accompanying text (Wisconsin).
9. See PRRAC-PROTECTIONS, supra note 7, app. B. For more on some of these local
laws, see infra notes 16, 19, 32, 41-46 and accompanying text (Austin, Texas); notes 15,
21, 49-50, 53, 55-56, 59-68 and accompanying text (Chicago); note 41 and accompanying
text (Indianapolis); note 11 (Los Angeles city and county); note 34 (Minneapolis); notes
15, 19-20, 32 and accompanying text (Montgomery County, Maryland); notes 39-40, 51,
53-54 and accompanying text (New York City); note 34 (Pittsburgh); notes 16, 19, 32,
37-38 and accompanying text (San Francisco); and notes 16, 19, 32, 53 and accompanying
text (Washington, D.C.).
10. See Alison Bell et al., Prohibiting Discrimination Against Renters Using Housing Vouch-
ers 3 (Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities 2018), available at https://www.cbpp.org.
11. For the New York state law, see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.2-a(a)-(e) (passed April 12,
2019); for the laws of Los Angeles city and county, see, respectively, L.A. MUN. CODE ch.
IV, § 1, art. 5.6.1 (passed June 24, 2019 (effective Jan. 1, 2020)), and L.A. CNTY. CODE OF
ORDS. ch. 858 (passed January 5, 2019).
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and other government housing subsidies.12 Others (e.g., Minnesota) outlaw
discrimination based on a person's receiving governmental "assistance,"
which may or may not include housing vouchers.3 Others outlaw discrim-
ination based on "source of income," but exclude voucher holders from
their protection, either explicitly in the statute or by court interpretation
(e.g., California, Wisconsin).4 Other "source of income" laws have been
interpreted to include voucher holders (e.g., Connecticut, New Jersey),1"
12. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.10 (2019) (making it unlawful, inter alia,
"for any person furnishing ... rental accommodations to discriminate against any indi-
vidual... who is a tenant receiving federal, state, or local housing subsidies.., because
the individual is such a recipient") (further described infra notes 22-27 and accompany-
ing text); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4581-A(4) (2019) (making it unlawful "[f]or
any person furnishing rental premises.., to refuse to rent.., to any individual who is
a recipient of federal, state or local public assistance, including ... housing subsidies,
primarily because of the individual's status as recipient") (further described infra note
27, para. 2).
13. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03, subd. 47(2), .09 subd. 1 (2019) (barring housing
discrimination because a tenant is "receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including
rental assistance or rent supplements"); see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-02(19),
.5-02 (1)-(2) (2019) (barring discrimination "because of... status with respect to ... public
assistance," which includes tenants "receiving federal, state, or local subsidies, including
rental assistance or rent supplements"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503(a) (2019) (barring
housing discrimination "because a person is a recipient of public assistance").
The Minnesota statute was interpreted to allow landlords to refuse Section 8 voucher
holders in Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 783 N.W.2d 171, 175-79 (Minn. App. 2010).
For a critique of the Edwards opinion, see Derek Waller, Leveraging State and Local Antidis-
crimination Laws to Prohibit Discrimination Against Recipients of Federal Rental Assistance, 27
J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 401, 415-21 (2018).
14. See Sabi v. Sterling, 183 Cal. App. 4th 916, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (2010) (holding
that California's fair housing law (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955, subd. (a)), which prohibits
discrimination based on a tenant's "source of income," does not cover Section 8 vouch-
ers); Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272,1282-83 (7th Cir. 1995) (interpreting
Wisconsin law, which bans housing discrimination based on "lawful source of income"
(WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(6)), not to include Section 8 vouchers); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 4607(j) (2019) (allowing, within Delaware's "source of income" law, landlords not
to participate in government rental-assistance programs).
Oregon's source-of-income law, as originally enacted in 1995, explicitly did not include
"federal rent subsidy payments under [Section 8] and any other local, state or federal
housing assistance," see OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.421(d)(A) (2010), but was amended in
2013 to include such assistance. See 2013 Or. Laws Ch. 740 (H.B. 2639) (amending OR.
REV. STAT. § 659A.421(d)(A)). California amended its statute in 2019 to include vouchers
and other forms of government housing assistance. See S.B. 329, 2019 Cal. Legis. Info.
(enrolled Sept. 13, 2019).
15. See Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d
238, 241 (Conn. 1999) (interpreting Connecticut's source-of-income law to require land-
lord acceptance of Section 8 vouchers); Franklin Tower One v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104,
1112-13 (N.J. 1999) (same, regarding New Jersey law); see also Montgomery Cnty. v.
Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 333-34 (Md. 2007) (same, regarding Montgomery
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with some explicitly providing for voucher coverage (e.g., Oregon, Wash-
ington, D.C.).6 As a result of these laws, over a third of all households
using vouchers are now protected by some form of state or local voucher-
antidiscrimination law.7
The breadth of these laws varies in other ways as well. Some apply only
to rental situations (e.g., Massachusetts),' but most cover a wider range of
housing transactions by, for example, simply including "source of income"
among the forbidden bases of discrimination in their fair housing laws.9
In addition, some state laws have foreclosed certain potential defenses
(e.g., a landlord's objecting not just to voucher holders as tenants, but also to
the requirements of the governmental program involved), either explicitly
County, Maryland, ordinance banning source-of-income discrimination); Godinez
v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 826-28 (Ill. App. 2004) (same, regarding Chicago's
source-of-income ordinance).
16. See supra note 14, para. 2 (Oregon); Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P'ship, 548 F.3d 1063,
1069-71 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the D.C. Human Rights Act, which bans discrimi-
nation in "any transaction in real property ... wholly or partially for a discriminatory
reason based on... an individual's source of income" (D.C. CODE § 2-1402.21(a)(1)-(2)),
"expressly defines 'source of income' as encompassing the Section 8 program [citing id.
§ 2-1402.21(e)]"); see also Austin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886,
894-96 (W.D. Tex. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-50186 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (Austin,
Texas, ordinance); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Post, 22 Cal. App. 5th 121, 124-25, 231
Cal. Rptr. 3d 235, 238 (2018), review denied, (July 11, 2018) (noting that San Francisco's fair
housing ordinance outlaws discrimination based on a person's "source of income" and
defines that term to include government rent subsidies (citing S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE
§ 3304, subd. (a))).
17. See Alison Bell et al., supra note 10, at 2 (estimating in late 2018 that about hirty-four
percent of families with vouchers "live in jurisdictions with voucher non-discrimination
protections"). This estimate occurred before source-of-income laws were passed by New
York State and the city and county of Los Angeles and before California expanded its law
to include vouchers, which will significantly increase this figure.
18. See supra note 12 (regarding Massachusetts and Maine); New York (see N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296.2-a(a) (2019)); New Jersey (see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (g) (2019) (limited to
rental and mortgage payments)); Washington (see WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18 (2019)).
19. These include Connecticut (described infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text);
California (described infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text); Oregon (see OR. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.421(2)-(6) (2019)); Utah (see UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5 (2019)); Vermont
(see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503(a) (2019)); and Wisconsin (see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 106.50(1)
(2019)); see also supra note 16 (describing the ordinances of Washington, D.C., Austin,
Texas, and San Francisco); Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325,
330-31 (Md. 2007) (quoting ordinance of Montgomery County, Maryland).
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(e.g., Massachusetts) or by judicial interpretation (e.g., New Jersey).21 Others
allow such defenses (e.g., Maine).
21
Two New England states provide examples of the different approaches.
In 1971, Massachusetts became the first state to enact a statute prohibiting
landlords from discriminating against persons using government vouch-
ers.' This statute does not apply to all of the transactions covered by the
state's fair housing law, but deals only with "rental accommodations ." 23 As
originally enacted, this provision prohibited landlords from discriminat-
ing against any recipient of public assistance or housing subsidies "solely
because the individual is such a recipient."24 In 1987, the state's supreme
court interpreted "solely" to allow a landlord to refuse Section 8 voucher
holders because he objected to terms in the standard lease mandated by the
program.25 Thereafter, the law was amended to remove the word "solely"
and to add a further prohibition barring landlords from discriminating
"because of any requirement of such public assistance, rental assistance,
or housing subsidy program."26 As a result, Massachusetts landlords now
may neither reject recipients of any housing assistance program nor use
as a defense in this situation their objection to the requirements of such a
program.27 By contrast, Connecticut has reached a similar result through a
20. See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421, 427-31 (Mass. 2007) (Mas-
sachusetts); Franklin Tower One v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1114 (N.J. 1999) (New Jersey); see
also Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 248,
250 (Conn. 1999) (Connecticut law); Feemster, 548 F.3d at 1069-71 (D.C. law); Montgomery
Cnty., 936 A.2d at 339-42 (county ordinance).
21. See Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 86 A.3d 52, 58-60 (Me. 2014)
(interpreting Maine law (further described infra note 27)); see also Godinez v. Sullivan-
Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. App. 2004) (holding that Chicago's source-of-income ban
includes Section 8 vouchers, but that landlords that reject voucher holders may raise
defenses related to the Section 8 program).
22. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(10), St.1971, c. 726.
23. See DiLiddo, 876 N.E.2d at 422 n.2.
24. See id. at 427.
25. Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. 1987). The Brown opinion distin-
guished between housing discrimination "solely" because a prospective tenant uses a
voucher and discrimination that occurs because a landlord refuses for economic or other
reasons to be subject to the voucher program's requirements. Id. at 1108-10.
26. See DiLiddo, 876 N.E.2d at 428 (describing these amendments, which were enacted
in 1990).
27. See id. at 429. Thus, landlords cannot claim that their objections to a program's
requirements amount to a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for an otherwise unlaw-
ful refusal to rent. As the DiLiddo opinion put it, the amended law delineates what is
"legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory" under the statute. Id. at 429. And the law does not
permit a defense based on the fact that the requirements of a housing subsidy program
may cause the landlord "substantial economic harm." Id. at 429-30.
By contrast, Maine's law, which paralleled the original version of the Massachusetts
law and which outlawed discrimination "primarily" on the forbidden basis, see supra
note 12, was not amended, leading that state's supreme court to interpret it to allow
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broader statute that simply added "lawful source of income" as a prohib-
ited basis to the state's fair housing law in 1990;a8 and, in a 1999 decision,
its state supreme court forbid landlords from refusing to rent to otherwise
qualified Section 8 tenants.29
II. Legal Challenges to State and Local Source-of-Income Laws
State and local laws that ban some form of source-of-income discrimina-
tion obviously go beyond the current FHA, but they are in no danger of
federal preemption on this ground, because the FHA authorizes state and
local laws to prohibit types of discrimination that go beyond those covered
in the FHA.0 However, some of these laws have been challenged as being
inconsistent with-and thus preempted by-Section 8's scheme, which
makes landlord participation in that program "voluntary."'" Generally,
these challenges have failed,32 but there is one exception: a 1995 decision
in which the Seventh Circuit interpreted Wisconsin's source-of-income law
not to include Section 8 vouchers, in part because the court was hesitant
"to allow a state to make a voluntary federal program mandatory."3
a landlord to reject voucher holders if its reason was to avoid the requirements of the
voucher program. See Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 86 A.3d 52, 58-60
(Me. 2014).
28. See Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238,
241 (Conn. 1999) (describing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (a)(1)-(2)) as being origi-
nally passed in 1989 as part of the state's public accommodations law, but made part of
the state's fair housing law in 1990).
29. See Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 739 A.2d at 241-42 (holding, inter
alia, that the Connecticut statute bars landlords from requiring a lease that deviates from
the Section 8 program's lease specifications or any other deviations from this program's
requirements).
30. See supra note 3.
31. Courts that have described the Section 8 program as being "voluntary" for land-
lords include Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890, 900
(5th Cir. 2019), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), and Salute v. Strat-
ford Greens Gardens Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1998); case cited infra note 33.
32. See Austin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886, 894-96 (W.D.
Tex. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-50186 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (city ordinance); Bour-
beau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87-89 (D.D.C. 2008) (D.C. ordinance);
Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 339-42 (Md. 2007) (county
ordinance); Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 739 A.2d at 245-46 (Connecticut
statute); Franklin Tower One, LLC v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104,1107-15 (N.J. 1999) (New Jersey
statute); Stevenson v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., 24 Cal. App. 4th 269, 280-81,29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 398, 405 (1994) (city ordinance); Attorney General v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105-06
(Mass. 1987) (Massachusetts tatute); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.53(d) (2018) (providing, in
HUD regulations implementing the voucher program, that the federal statutes creating it
are not intended "to pre-empt operation of State and local laws that prohibit discrimina-
tion against a Section 8 voucher-holder because of status as a Section 8 voucher-holder").
33. Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
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The scores of different local ordinances that ban some form of source-of-
income discrimination reveal an even greater variety of coverage than the
states' laws. Many of these ordinances go beyond their state's fair housing
laws, which has prompted some landlords to challenge local laws as being
inconsistent with-and thus preempted by-their state's law.34 The results
of these challenges have varied depending on the specific language of the
particular state law involved.
For example, California's fair housing law, which since 1999 has
banned source-of-income discrimination but does not cover vouchers and
other government subsidies,' provides that it is intended "to occupy the
field . . . encompassed" by its anti-discrimination provisions.36 San Fran-
cisco's source-of-income ordinance, passed a year earlier, explicitly includes
voucher holders within its protection,37 leading landlords in that city to
claim that this ordinance was preempted by the state law. In rejecting this
claim, the California Court of Appeal read the state's preemption clause
narrowly, thus leaving intact San Francisco's broader law.38
Yet preemption challenges to New York City's source-of-income law,
which compels landlords to accept governmental vouchers, have achieved
a modicum of success based on a state statute that prevents local govern-
ments from extending their rent-control regulations. While this law does
not block the city's basic mandate to landlords to accept vouchers,3 9 it has
been held to narrow the city's mandate so as not to compel landlords to
accept a local subsidy program that requires extension of leases at the same
rent.
40
34. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text; cf. Fletcher Properties, Inc. v. City
of Minneapolis, 931 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing trial court's ruling that
Minneapolis ordinance, which bars rental discrimination against voucher holders and
other public assistance recipients and based on "the requirements of a public assistance
program," violated landlords' rights under state constitution's due process and equal
protection provisions); Apartment Ass'n of Metro. Pittsburgh, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh,
No. 107 WAL 2019, 2019 WL 4253476 (Pa. Sept. 9, 2019) (vacating and remanding for
further review lower court's determination that Pittsburgh's source-of-income ordinance
was invalid under state's "home rule" law insofar as the ordinance requires landlords to
accept Section 8 voucher holders).
35. See Sabi v. Sterling, 183 Cal. App. 4th 916, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (2010) (described
supra note 14).
36. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993, subd. (c) (2019).
37. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Post, 22 Cal. App. 5th 121, 124-25, 231 Cal. Rptr.
3d 235, 238 (2018), review denied (July 11, 2018) (describing S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE § 3304,
subd. (a)).
38. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Post, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238.
39. See Tapia v. Successful Mgt. Corp., 79 A.D.3d 422, 425, 915 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1st Dept.
2010).
40. See Alston v. Starrett City, Inc., 161 A.D.3d 37, 74 N.Y.S.3d 211 (N.Y. App. Div.
2018).
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In Texas and Indiana, state laws were passed in 2015-in response to
ordinances enacted, respectively, by Austin and Indianapolis-barring
localities from outlawing discrimination against voucher holders.41 Aus-
tin's ordinance, enacted in 2014, was initially challenged unsuccessfully by
local landlords, producing a decision holding that current Texas law did
not preempt it.42 Thereafter, the state passed legislation barring all of its
localities from prohibiting landlords "from refusing to lease or rent ... to a
person because the person's lawful source of income to pay rent includes
funding from a federal housing assistance program."4 Austin responded
with a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing this
law based on its alleged disparate impact on minorities.44 In 2018, the dis-
trict court upheld this claim based on the FHA provision that condemns
any state law purporting "to require or permit any action that would be a
discriminatory housing practice" under the FHA,4 a ruling that Texas has
appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which instructed the district court to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
46
III. Litigation Experience
A. Types of Cases and a Caution
Virtually all of the claims made under state and local laws banning source-
of-income discrimination in housing have been brought against landlords
or their agents. This is explained in part by the fact that some of these laws
(e.g., those in Massachusetts and Maine) are limited to rental situations.
4
1
However, most of these laws, like the FHA, also ban discrimination in
41. See TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 250.007(c) (2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3-8.5
(2019). The Texas law was also prompted by concerns that Dallas would adopt a voucher-
included source-of-income law, which it did in 2016. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v.
Abbott, No. 3:17-CV-0440-D, 2018 WL 2415034, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2018).
42. See Austin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886, 892-93 (W.D.
Tex. 2015) (denying preliminary injunction against city's source-of-income ordinance that
covers voucher holders based on plaintiff-association's failure to show likelihood of suc-
cess under various theories), appeal dismissed, No. 15-50186 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015)).
43. TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 250.007(a); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 2018
WL 2415034, at *4-11 (dismissing on standing and jurisdictional grounds private plain-
tiff's challenge to this law).
44. See infra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 2018
WL 2415034, *n.1 (quoting plaintiff's allegation that, although Texas's renter households
are only 19% Black, the "Texas voucher population is 86% minority with 55% Black, Non-
Hispanic tenants and 30% Hispanic tenants").
45. See City of Austin v. Paxton, 325 F. Supp.3d 749, 759-60 (W.D. Tex. July 12, 2018),
appeal filed, No. 18-50646 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting the FHA's 42 U.S.C. § 3615, which pro-
vides that "any law of a State, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that pur-
ports to require or permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice
under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid").
46. City of Austin v. Paxton, No. 18-50646, 2019 WL 6520769, at *8 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2019).
47. See supra notes 12, 18 and accompanying text.
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sales, financing, insurance, and other housing transactions;4 and, even in
these places, the vast majority of source-of-income cases have involved
rental housing.
For example, Chicago's fair housing ordinance covers a wide variety
of housing transactions and has outlawed source-of-income discrimination
since 1990.49 The agency that enforces this law-the Chicago Commission
on Human Relations ("CCHR")-has produced a total of eighteen deci-
sions in fully litigated cases involving source-of-income discrimination,
and all dealt with rental situations.0 A similar pattern exists in New York
City and other places with an active source-of-income docket." Indeed,
source-of-income claims against defendants other than landlords have pro-
duced only a handful of reported decisions.
52
One caution is worth noting here. Experience in places with source-of-
income laws shows that such prohibitions are not a panacea for this type
of discrimination. In New York City and Chicago, for example, substantial
non-compliance by housing providers has continued years after enactment
of the local source-of-income law.53 In 2018, the New York City Commission
48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-8-030 (2019).
50. See CHI. COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, BOARD RULING DIGEST (2018) (describ-
ing the CCHR's rulings in cases from 2002 through early 2018 and reporting that, of the
eighteen housing cases that alleged source-of-income discrimination, all were brought
against landlords or their agents). Some of these CCHR cases are discussed infra notes
60-61, 63-67, 69 and accompanying text.
51. Reported cases involving New York City's source-of-income law in rental situa-
tions include L.C. v. Lefrak Organization, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 391, 403405 (S.D.N.Y. 2013),
and Cates v. New Castle Hill Realty, No. 10 CIV. 3426 DAB, 2011 WL 335599 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
31, 2011).
52. For an example of a state case involving a non-landlord defendant, see Sisemore v.
Master Fin., Inc. 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1386 (2007) (upholding source-of-
income claim against finance company that refused mortgage to Sisemore for home she
intended to use as a daycare). Hostility to voucher holders by insurance companies and
municipalities has also been challenged in some FHA cases based on its negative impact
on racial minorities and other classes protected by the FHA. See, e.g., Nat'l Fair Hous.
Alliance v. Travelers Indem. Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D.D.C. 2017); Cmty. Action League v.
City of Palmdale, Cal., No. CV 11-4817 ODW VBKX, 2012 WL 10647285 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1,
2012). See generally Schwemm, supra note 5.
53. See N.Y. CITY COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT
37-38 (2018) (reporting that, in 2018, source-of-income complaints accounted for over
one-third (94 out of 274) of the total housing complaints received); CHI. COMM'N ON
HUMAN RELATIONS, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2018) (reporting that, in 2017, almost half of
the housing discrimination complaints received (30 out of 64) "alleged source of income
discrimination, most of which involve Housing Choice Vouchers"); CHI. COMM'N ON
HUMAN RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT: 2009 8 (2010) (reporting that, in 2009, two-thirds (40
out of 60) of the housing discrimination complaints received claimed source-of-income
discrimination); see also Isabelle M. Thabault & Eliza P. Platts-Mills, Discrimination Against
Participants in the Housing Choice Voucher Program: An Enforcement Strategy, 15 POVERTY
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on Human Rights, noting "the pervasive problem of landlords refusing to
rent to tenants with housing vouchers," established a special enforcement
unit "focused exclusively on combatting source of income discrimination"
and used testers "to verify reports of such pervasive discrimination.""
In Chicago, the CCHR, having recognized that source-of-income dis-
crimination "continues as a significant fair housing issue," retained a local
civil rights organization to conduct a tester-based study of this type of
discrimination," the results of which were published in 2018 and showed
substantial ongoing source-of-income discrimination.6
B. Cases Against Landlords
Source-of-income cases against landlords fall into two categories: (1) those
in which the defendant admits its source-of-income discrimination, but
tries to justify this practice; and (2) those in which the landlord denies the
charge. In the former, landlords have argued that the burdens of dealing
with the Section 8 program (e.g., additional paperwork; required lease pro-
visions; inspections by government agencies) justify their not participat-
ing in this program. Some states and localities allow such a defense (e.g.,
Maine), while other do not, either because their laws explicitly foreclose it
(e.g., Massachusetts) or by judicial interpretation of their laws (e.g., New
Jersey).7
Cases in which a landlord denies the charge of source-of-income dis-
crimination may present a variety of practices, including outright refusals
to rent;8 discrimination in the terms or conditions of the rental;59 "steer-
& RACE 11, 12 (2006) (reporting that, although the Washington, D.C., Human Rights Act
had prohibited source-of-income discrimination since 1977, a 2003-2005 testing program
there showed that fifty-eight percent of landlords either refused to accept vouchers or
placed significant limitations on their use).
54. N.Y. CITY COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2018);
see also id. at 33-34 (reporting that the N.Y.C. Commission launched its own investiga-
tions, including testing, in almost 200 housing cases, the vast majority of which involved
source-of-income discrimination).
55. See CHI. COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2018).
56. See CHI. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, FAIR HOUSING TESTING PROJECT FOR
THE CHI. COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS (2018) (reporting that in Chicago, even after
the city's law had banned source-of-income discrimination since 1990, tests continued to
show such discrimination); see also LAWYERS' COMM. FOR BETTER HOUSING, INC., LOCKED
OUT: BARRIERS TO CHOICE FOR HOUSING VOUCHER HOLDERS 10-11 (2002) (finding, in ear-
lier Chicago study, that seventy percent of tests showed source-of-income discrimination).
57. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
58. State and local fair housing laws that are modeled on the FHA ban not only out-
right refusals to rent on a prohibited basis, but also discriminatory negotiations and other
practices that make housing unavailable. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2019); SCHWEMM, supra
note 1, § 13:2.
59. In addition to banning refusals to rent on a prohibited basis, state and local laws
modeled on the FHA also outlaw harsher terms, stricter application requirements, and
other discriminatory conditions of rental. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); SCHWEMM, supra note
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ing," e.g., by narrowing a prospective tenant's options to certain properties
that already accept vouchers;6 and/or discriminatory ads, statements, and
other communications in which the defendant announces its policy against
renting to government-assisted tenants.
61
All of these claims present issues of proof that can be decided using
familiar principles that have long been established in FHA cases, as dem-
onstrated by the eighteen decisions issued by Chicago's CCHR over the
past two decades.62 These principles include the possibility of proving a
defendant's unlawful motivation by direct evidence,63 and the fact that
claims proven by direct evidence generally involve a defendant's ads or
statements that would also be unlawful;' in the absence of direct evidence,
use of circumstantial evidence through the "prima-facie-case" method of
1, § 14:2 nn.l-5 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Ranjit Hakin, Executive Director, Cook
County [Illinois] Dep't of Human Rights and Ethics, Memorandum Regarding Source of
Income Protections Under Cook County Human Rights Ordinance (Nov. 20, 2013) (advising
landlords and property managers that they should not treat "voucher holders less favor-
ably than other potential tenants by inflating rents or screening such applicants more
stringently" or by applying rent-to-income-ratio requirements in a manner that discrimi-
nates against voucher holders); see also Brown v. Tam Khuong An Nguyen, CCHR No.
15-H-7, at 4 (Jan. 12, 2017) (noting that a prima facie case of illegal discrimination under
Chicago's source-of-income ordinance may be made out by showing that the complain-
ant "was offered housing on terms different from the offers made to others").
60. A landlord's "steering" has long been understood to make housing "unavail-
able" in violation of the FHA's § 3604(a) and similarly worded state and local laws, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 1, §§ 13:5-13:6, and may also violate other provisions of these
statutes, see id. § 14:2 n.20 and accompanying text (discussing steering as a violation of
the FHA's § 3604(b)). Steering cases from the Chicago Commission on Human Relations
include Hawkins v. Village Green Holding Co., LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 9 (July 12, 2018)
(rejecting source-of-income steering claim based on inadequate proof).
61. Ads, statements, and notices that indicate a discriminatory preference or limita-
tion violate state and local laws that include a provision like the FHA's § 3604(c). See
SCHWEMM, supra note 1, at ch. 15. For examples from the Chicago Commission on Human
Relations, see infra note 64.
62. The CCHR has determined to interpret Chicago's fair housing ordinance in line
with FHA precedents. See, e.g., Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 14 n.8
(May 11, 2017). This is also true for most states and localities with fair housing laws. See
SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 30:2 n.4, para. 2.
63. See SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 10:2 nn.6-8 and accompanying text. Examples from
the CCHR include Hall v. Woodgett, CCHR No. 13-H-51, at 4-5 (Oct. 8,2015); Shipp v. Wag-
ner, CCHR No. 12-H-19, at 7 (July 16, 2014); Rankin v. 6954 N. Sheridan, Inc., CCHR No.
08-H-49, at 7 (Aug. 18, 2010); Diaz v. Wykurz, CCHR No. 07-H-28, at 6-7 (Dec. 16, 2009).
64. See SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 10:2 n.7 and accompanying text. Examples from the
CCHR include Shipp v. Wagner, CCHR No. 12-H-19, at 7 (July 16, 2014), and Hutchison v.
Iftekaruddin, CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 7 (Feb. 17, 2010).
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proving illegal intent;' if the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case
due to not having applied to the defendant, the availability of the "futile
gesture" theory to excuse this failure;66 and the use of testers to show that
a defendant's proferred justification for not dealing with a protected-class
member is really a pretext for discrimination rather than a legitimate
excuse.
67
Although less common than claims of intentional discrimination,
disparate-impact claims based on source-of-income discrimination have
also been dealt with in CCHR decisions. The Chicago cases have usually
involved a voucher-holder's challenge to a landlord's minimum income
requirement (e.g., that a tenant's income must be at least three times the
rent), with the CCHR-based on FHA precedents-recognizing that such




Federal law allows housing providers to discriminate against people
who rely on vouchers and other forms of governmental assistance, but a
growing number of states and localities have banned housing discrimina-
tion based on source of income. The specific provisions of these laws vary,
but together they now cover a major portion of the nation's voucher users
and also bar a form of discrimination that disproportionately harms racial
minorities and other groups currently protected by the Fair Housing Act.
This Article has reviewed these state and local laws and the key cases
and litigation issues they have generated. This review highlights some of
the advantages-and challenges-of adding source of income to a housing
law's prohibited bases of discrimination.
65. See SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 10:2 nn.25-26 and accompanying text. Examples
from the CCHR include Hawkins v. Village Green Holding Co., LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-35,
at 6 (July 12, 2018); Gardner v. Ojo, CCHR No. 10-H-50, at 10 (Dec. 19, 2012); Hutchison v.
Iftekaruddin, CCHR No. 09-H-21, at 6 (Feb. 17, 2010).
66. See SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 10:2 n.35, para. 2. Examples from the CCHR include
Rankin v. 6954 N. Sheridan, Inc., CCHR No. 08-H-49, at 7-8 (Aug. 18, 2010); see also Hawkins
v. Village Green Holding Co., LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-35, at 8-9 (July 12, 2018) (ruling against
futile gesture theory here); Gardner v. Ojo, CCHR No. 10-H-50, at 12 (Dec. 19, 2012) (same).
67. See SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 32:2 (discussing the use of testers to prove housing
discrimination). In places where local fair housing laws have banned source-of-income
discrimination, some enforcement agencies and advocacy groups have already used test-
ing to produce evidence of this form of illegal discrimination. See, e.g., supra notes 55-56
and accompanying text (Chicago); supra note 54 and accompanying text (New York City
and Washington, D.C.).
68. See Nibbs v. PT Chicago, LLC, CCHR No. 14-H-61, at 13-18, 23-28 (May 11, 2017)
(ruling against impact claim due to inadequate proof). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note
1, § 10:6 (describing disparate-impact claims under the FHA).
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Banning source-of-income discrimination, though not a panacea, can
help expand housing opportunities and end arbitrary limits on housing
choice. Further, as Congress considers adding a source-of-income amend-
ment to the FHA, the experience of the states and localities that have
already taken this step provides both guidance and reassurance that such
an amendment is workable, a factor on which Congress has previously
relied in adding new protected classes to the FHA.69
69. See SCHWEMM, supra note 1, § 11E:1 n.1 and accompanying text (describing the
1988 Congress's reliance on the fact that numerous states and localities had earlier banned
housing discrimination against families with children in support of its decision to amend
the FHA to prohibit familial status discrimination).
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